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Baylor University 
This essay proposes that Socrates practiced various spiritual exercises, 
including meditation, and that this Socratic practice of meditation was 
habitual, aimed at cultivating emotional self-control and existential prepared-
ness. Contemporary research in neurobiology supports the view that 
intentional mental actions, including meditation, have a profound impact on 
brain activity, neuroplasticity, and help engender emotional self-control. This 
impact on brain activity is confirmed via technological developments, a prime 
example of how technology benefits humanity. Socrates attains the 
balanced emotional self-control that Alcibiades describes in the Symposium 
because of the sustained mental effort he exerts that directly impacts his 
brain and his emotional and philosophical life. The essay concludes that 
Socratic meditative practices aimed at manifesting true dignity as human 
beings within the complexities of a technological world offer a promising 
model of self-care worthy of embracing today. 
PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 
T he tension between philosophy and technology has a long history. Indeed, one of the earliest formulations of the philosophical mistrust 
of technological development occurs in Plato's Phaedrus. There, 
Socrates warns Phaedrus that the craft of writing will prove detrimental to the 
human capacity to remember and recollect essential truths about the cosmos 
(Plato 1997: 274d-275c). One might rightly ask: What, then, does the 
possibility of meditative practices in the Socratic dialogues, and contemporary 
claims concerning the influence of meditation on brain activity, have to do 
with transhumanism and implications of technology regarding human dignity, 
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and the very notion of what it means to be human? There are two related 
points. The first concerns our rapidly expanding understanding of the 
neurological impact of meditation. Many different traditions that have 
endured for centuries--Yoga practitioners in ancient India, Christian monks in 
the Egyptian desert, and Greek philosophical schools, particularly those 
associated with the Pythagorean and Parmenidean traditions--contain the idea 
that meditative practices are a key part of a larger system of beliefs and 
practices that free the self from bondage and lead to a wise and happy life, 
indeed to a truly human life. 
Most contemporary super-meditators (even Christians) utilize practices 
that go back to ancient Buddhist and Hindu practices. The ancient Greek 
meditators may have had some awareness of Eastern religious thought. 
Technology, for instance the invention of MRI machines, allows one to see 
what is happening in the brain when people meditate. This research suggests 
that persons who have spent years practicing meditation have stronger focus 
and attentive skills, improved memory, and different brain activity when 
compared to the novice meditator, or non-meditator. The primary purposes 
of meditation in these various traditions include overcoming external 
distractions, focusing the mind toward what is essential, and gaining control 
over one's passions. The technology associated with contemporary 
neurobiological research suggests that these meditative practices deliver on 
their promises to help human beings maintain their dignity in a variety of 
complex situations. Furthermore, technology can demonstrate how different 
forms of meditation affect the brain differently, and thus help refine the 
meditative practices to achieve certain ends. 
The second point of connection between technology, transhumanism, and 
Socratic use of meditation is related to the first: the goal of meditative 
practices is to transcend the prosaic human experience and achieve all that the 
human being is truly capable of accomplishing. As Socrates states in the 
Phaedo: "Every seeker of wisdom knows that up to the time when philosophy 
takes it over his soul is a helpless prisoner, chained hand and foot in the body 
... philosophy takes over the soul in this condition and by gentle persuasion 
tries to set it free" (1997: 82e-83a). Again, in the Symposium, Socrates says 
that when the philosopher "looks upon beauty's visible presentment," he "will 
be quickened with the true, and not the seeming, virtue .... And when he has 
brought forth and reared this perfect virtue, he shall be called the friend of 
god, and if ever it is given to man to put on immortality, it shall be given to 
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him" (1997: 210a-212b). Philosophy is about becoming a certain kind of 
person, liberated from the chains ofignorance and impulsive desire, and freed 
to love and pursue the good, indeed, to achieve a kind of immortality. As 
Pierre Hadot intimates, "the real problem (for Socrates) is therefore not the 
problem of knowing this or that, but of being in this way or that way" (2002: 
29). 
Socrates wishes to persuade his interlocutors to become less concerned 
with what they have (and surely these possessions include propositional 
knowledge), and more concerned with becoming "as good and as wise as 
possible," as he emphasizes in the Apology (1997: 36c). Put differently, the 
practice of philosophy calls us to become a certain kind of person who is no 
longer pushed to and fro by the winds of aimless amygdala-generated desire, 
but free to align oneself through the use of the prefrontal cortex with higher 
values and ends. However, this liberation requires what Hadot calls spiritual 
exercises, defined as those "practices which could be physical, as in dietary 
regimes, or discursive, as in dialogue and meditation, or intuitive, as in 
contemplation, but which were intended to effect a modification and a 
transformation in the subject who practiced them" (2002: 6). According to 
Hadot: "The philosopher teacher's discourse could also assume the form of a 
spiritual exercise, if the discourse were presented in such a way that the 
disciple, as auditor, reader, or interlocutor, could make spiritual progress and 
transform himself within" (2002: 6). This task of self-transformation involves 
an intimate awareness of the emotional dimensions of our experience, as well 
as the intellectual ones, so that we will not be unduly swayed by emotional 
response to stimuli. Socrates both alludes to, and engages in, these practices 
in a number of dialogues such as the Phaedo, Symposium, Crito, Republic, 
and Theaetetus. 
Peter Kingsley (1995) believes that the Western philosophical tradition 
contains its own unique spiritual practices that should be understood on their 
own terms. Put broadly, Kingsley describes this Western wisdom tradition in 
these terms: "They were called 'the wise' because their wisdom verged on the 
divine; because they were able to see beyond the surface and behind 
appearances; because they were able to interpret oracles and dreams and the 
riddles of existence" (1999: 27). Kingsley argues that these thinkers clustered 
around Pythagorean communities, and later influenced Parmenides and his 
spiritual and philosophical practices as well. Parmenides and his followers 
practiced a particular kind of meditation called incubation: "They would lie 
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down in an enclosed space. Often it was a cave. And either they'd fall asleep 
and have a dream or they'd enter a state described as neither sleep nor waking-
-and eventually they; d have a vision" (Kingsley 1999: 80). While Kingsley 
sees Socrates' and Plato's approach to philosophy outside the scope of these 
practices, one might disagree. Put briefly, Kingsley regards Plato as having 
engaged in patricide against "father Parmenides," and that Plato engaged in 
a deliberate obfuscation of these practices in the dialogues (1999: 45). How-
ever, there is substantial evidence in the Platonic dialogues, including Socratic 
meditative practices, that should lead Kingsley to regard Socrates and Plato 
as friends of philosophy as a spiritually meditative practice rather than its 
primary foes. Socratic meditation is an important, though often overlooked, 
part of that spiritual tradition. An exploration of Socratic meditative practices 
and contemporary research on the effects of meditation on the brain are 
relevant to the present discussion oftranshumanism and technology. 
But what, precisely, is meant by Socratic meditative practices? Plato's 
Symposium contains two accounts of Socrates going into a trance state. The 
first occurs when Socrates withdraws into his own thoughts and lags behind 
his companion, Aristodemus, on their way to Agathon' s house. Socrates 
stands silently, alone with his thoughts, unwilling to enter the party despite 
several invitations ( 1997: 17 4d-e ). Much later in the dramatic action, 
Alcibiades offers a second account of Socrates in another trance. Alcibiades 
tells his fellow symposiasts about a day during the Potidaea campaign of the 
Peloponnesian War when Socrates stood stark still from early morning until 
the next morning, "puzzling on some problem" (1997: 200d). One may infer 
that in his moments of silence Socrates is engaging in meditative practices that 
can be better understood in light of recent research in neurobiology. 
Though the descriptions of this Socratic silent activity are minimal, 
spiritual exercises are alluded to in the dialogues, in addition to moments 
where Socrates is engaged in meditation. This indicates that Socrates engaged 
in spiritual practices--particularly meditative practices--habitually. Second, 
these trances are best understood as a meditative practice aimed at achieving 
emotional self-control. This view is supported by evidence from the dialogues 
in addition to the Symposium, including references to Socratic silence in the 
Phaedo, the discussion of the soul's highest activity in the Phaedo, and a 
harmony model of the self-comportment articulated in the Republic. Finally, 
contemporary research in neurobiology supports the view that intentional 
mental actions, including meditation, have a profound impact on brain 
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activity, neuroplasticity, and help engender emotional self-control. Thus, 
Socrates attains the balanced emotional self-control that Alcibiades describes 
because of the sustained mental effort he exerts that directly impacts his brain 
and his emotional and philosophical life. 
INTERPRETING THE TEXTUAL EVIDENCE 
Three aspects of these passages in the Symposium are of considerable 
philosophical significance. First, there are descriptions of Socrates' trance 
states. Second, they reveal how Socrates himself describes the results of these 
states. By Socrates, we mean Socrates the dramatic character in the dialogue 
that Plato creates, and not the historical Socrates. Third, exploring the results 
of contemporary research on the neurological effects of meditation expertise 
sheds further light on how Socrates' experiential states shape his interactions 
with others. 
Apollodorus, the narrator of the Symposium, relates that Aristodemus 
meets Socrates on his way to Agathon' s party: "One day he ran into Socrates, 
who had just bathed and put on his fancy sandals--both very unusual events. 
So he asked him where he was going, and why he was looking so good" 
(1997: 174a). Socrates invites Aristodemus along. After some disagreement 
about the appropriateness of his invitation, Aristodemus agrees: "With these 
words, they set out. But as they were walking, Socrates began to think about 
something, lost himself in thought, and kept lagging behind. Whenever 
Aristodemus stopped to wait for him, Socrates would urge him to go on 
ahead" (1997: 174dee). Apollodorus notes several important things about 
Socrates' behavior. He is in the company of another person. He is walking. 
He begins to think about something, though Apollodorus does not report the 
content of Socrates' thought process. He also does not even say that the 
conversation stimulates Socrates' thought. Indeed, it appears that Socrates 
starts to think about something else while having a conversation with 
Aristodemus. Socrates becomes lost in thought and lags behind, which 
suggests Aristodemus is in no way a part of the experience. At least in the 
initial stages of this experience, Socrates is not so lost in thought that he 
cannot move or speak. He can still urge Aristodemus to go ahead to 
Agathon's party. 
Aristodemus follows Socrates' prompting. He arrives at Agathon's 
house, alone and uninvited. Agathon graciously assures Aristodemus that he 
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is glad Socrates invited him along, but wonders where Socrates is: "But where 
is he?" (1997:175a). He sends a slave to look for Socrates. Apollodorus 
observes: "Then another slave entered and said, 'Socrates is here, but he's 
gone off to the neighbor's porch. He's standing there and won't come in even 
though I called him several times"' (1997:175a). In this passage, Socrates is 
capable of movement--at least enough where he makes it to the neighbor's 
porch. But again, he simply stands there. It is unclear if "won't come in" 
means that he did give some response to the slave, or that he did not respond 
at all. As with Aristodemus earlier, the slave makes repeated attempts to get 
him out of this state. Whatever is happening in the experience is important 
enough to Socrates that he continues his practice despite repeated attempts to 
get him out of the experience. 
Agathon continues his attempts to bring Socrates to the party. He listens 
to the slave's report that Socrates will not come inside despite calling him 
several times (1997: 175a). Then, he tells his slave to bring Socrates in 
anyway: "Go back and bring him in. Don't leave him there'" (1997: 175a). At 
this point, Aristodemus intervenes. Apollodorus narrates: "But Aristodemus 
stopped him. 'No, no,' he said. 'Leave him alone. It's one of his habits: 
every now and then he just goes off like that and stands motionless, wherever 
he happens to be. I'm sure he'll come in very soon, so don't disturb him; let 
him be'" (1997:175a-b). Aristodemus' role has changed. In the opening 
passage, Aristodemus seems uncomfortable with Socrates' practice. Now, he 
claims to be an authority on Socrates' behavior. From his testimony, one 
learns that Socrates habitually engages in this behavior. Aristodemus 
describes it as "going off," and refers to him as "standing motionless." 
Aristodemus also notes that the experience does not last long. From these 
initial descriptions of Socrates' behavior, one may infer the following about 
this Socratic practice: It is habitual, but not constant. He goes off somewhere 
or becomes lost in thought. He stands motionless. It does not matter where 
he is. Also, it does not last long. 
How does Aristodemus know that Socrates engages in this practice 
habitually? The opening lines of the Symposium indicate that Aristodemus 
used to follow Socrates around all the time. Apollodorus notes that he was 
"one of the worst cases at that time" (1997: 173c). If so, it seems likely 
Aristodemus would be in a position to report on Socrates' behavior to 
Agathon who seems to accept Aristodemus' authority, at least momentarily. 
In the Symposium, Apollodorus reports that: 
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So they went ahead and started eating, but there was still no sign of 
Socrates. Agathon wanted to send for him many times, but Aristodemus 
wouldn't let him. And, in fact, Socrates came in shortly afterward, as he 
always did--they were hardly halfway through their meal. Agathon, who 
as it happened, was all alone on the farthest couch, immediately called: 
"Socrates, come lie down next to me. Who knows, ifl touch you, I may 
catch a bit of the wisdom that came to you under my neighbor's porch. 
It's clear you've seen the light. If you hadn't, you'd still be standing 
there" (1997: 175d). 
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Aristodemus successfully protects Socrates. His prediction that the trance 
would not last long proves correct. Socrates appears and Agathon greets him 
enthusiastically. From Agathon's description, one may gather additional 
details about what might be occurring during this experience. Agathon calls 
it "a bit of wisdom." He exclaims that Socrates has "seen the light." He also 
attests to Socrates' commitment to the experience, noting that surely Socrates 
would not come back in if he had not attained the insight he was seeking. 
Though Agathon seems to respond positively to Socrates' experience, it is also 
clear that he has little understanding of how to achieve this sort of insight 
himself. Apollodorus recounts that: 
Socrates sat down next to him and said, "How wonderful it would be, 
dear Agathon, if the foolish were filled with wisdom simply by touching 
the wise. If only wisdom were like water, which always flows from a full 
cup into an empty one when we connect them with a piece of yarn--well, 
then I would consider it the greatest prize to have the chance to lie down 
next to you. I would soon be overflowing with your wonderful wisdom. 
My own wisdom is of no account--a shadow in a dream-while yours is 
bright and radiant and has a splendid future" (1997: l 75e ). 
Socrates corrects Agathon' s misconception. He does not dispute that it 
is wisdom he is after or that it provides "light." But he disputes the mode of 
transmission of this meditative insight. The insight he gains is not something 
he can readily share with Agathon. Socrates offers some detail about what he 
sees during this experience. He says it is like a shadow in a dream. This is a 
curious statement. What is knowledge of a dream like? Often, the knowledge 
gained is fleeting. Often, we do not remember the dream for very long upon 
waking. The transitory nature of dream memory makes what we learn through 
the experience quite elusive. What is a shadow in a dream like? A shadow 
of a dream would seem more elusive still. It is a dream within a dream. 
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However, this line of interpretation does not accord with Socrates' 
experience of dreams, and their interpretation in the Crito. Socrates' 
knowledge from his dream is detailed and quite specific. He has no difficulty 
describing its contents to Crito: "I thought that a beautiful and comely woman 
dressed in white approached me. She called me and said, 'Socrates, may you 
arrive at Fertile Phthia on the third day'" (1997: 44c ). Though Crito thinks the 
image is strange, Socrates has no difficulty interpreting its meaning for Crito: 
"But it seems clear enough to me" (1997: 44d). This discontinuity with the 
dream experience described in the Crito suggests that what occurs in this 
experience in the Symposium is different from a dream, despite the fact that 
Socrates describes it as dream-like. Perhaps Socrates means that the dream-
like insight contains some hidden truth that needs to be interpreted, but unlike 
the Crito, Socrates does not offer an interpretation to the symposiasts. It is 
also curious that Socrates says it is of no account. Surely, he does not mean 
that the knowledge is worthless. Perhaps he simply means he lacks the words 
for it. He does not have a logos to describe it. Pierre Hadot mentions that 
contemplation studies indicate that thinking can continue after discursive 
language has ceased and, specifically, that philosophical activity can and does 
sometimes continue when discourse has ended (2002: 5). 
Pataiijali underscores the use of chanting OM as an effective means of 
stilling the fluctuations of the mind (Bryant 2009: YS 1.28). However, even 
these linguistic practices are ultimately aimed at training the mind to reach 
beyond the limits of linguistic experience. For example, later in The Yoga 
Sutra, Pataiijali describes the meditator as moving beyond even the subject/ 
object distinction, or duality itself (Bryant 2009: YS 2.48). There are also 
examples in the Christian Monastic tradition, such as the Jesus Prayer: "Jesus, 
Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner." While the prayer has cognitive-
linguistic content, the aim is to move beyond the cognitive content to deeper 
knowledge of the self and the divine. Socrates describes the results of his 
experience as shadowy, dream-like, and elusive. 
The second description of Socrates' trance state in the Symposium adds 
to our understanding of what Socrates might be experiencing. Though 
Aristodemus reports that Socrates' trances are habitual, there is only one other 
sustained description of them in the Platonic corpus, in the same dialogue 
when another uninvited guest, Alcibiades, appears at the party. A great deal 
takes place before Alcibiades arrives. The symposiasts each give their 
speeches in praise oflove. Phaedrus describes love as a great god, and argues 
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that love stimulates lovers to great actions for the sake of their beloveds (1997: 
l 78e). Pausanias articulates two forms oflove, the noble and the base (1997: 
l 80e ). Eryximachus expands the understanding oflove to a force undergirding 
the cosmos (1997: 188d). Aristophanes offers comic relief as he articulates 
a vision of love as the search for our missing half (1997: 192e ). Agathon 
presents his self-aggrandizing account oflove as a beautiful young god, while 
Socrates refutes Agathon (1997: 198a, 199d-20lc). Socrates reports his 
conversations with the great priestess Diotima, who taught him about love and 
many other things (1997: 20ld-212c). Just as Aristophanes is getting ready 
to respond to how Socrates alluded to his own speech (1997: 212c ), Alcibiades 
arrives at the gate. 
Alcibiades' appearance at the party adds a great deal of emotionality to 
the scene. He breaks in with a large drunken party, "accompanied by the 
shrieks of some flute-girl" (1997: 21 ld). Alcibiades, "very drunk and very 
loud," demands to see Agathon. Apollodorus reports that "he was half carried 
into the house by the flute-girl and some other companions" (1997: 212d). The 
symposiasts eagerly invite him in. They seem quite ready for a break from the 
philosophical direction Socrates' speech has taken. Alcibiades explains it 
would be improper to praise anyone else in Socrates' presence. He gives a 
speech in praise of Socrates as his contribution to the speeches in praise of 
love. Alcibiades recounts his attempts to seduce Socrates, and his own 
experiences serving with him in the bloody Potidaea campaign of the 
Peloponnesian War: 
One day, at dawn, he started thinking about some problem or other; he 
just stood outside, trying to figure it out. He couldn't resolve it, but he 
wouldn't give up. He simply stood there, glued to the same post. By 
midday, many soldiers had seen him, and quite mystified, they told 
everyone that Socrates had been standing there all day, thinking about 
something. He was still there when evening came, and after dinner some 
Ionians moved their bedding outside, where it was cooler and more 
comfortable (all this took place in summer), but mainly in order to watch 
if Socrates was going to stay out there all night. And so he did; he stood 
on the very same spot until dawn! He only left next morning, when the 
sun came out, and he made his prayers to the new day (1997: 220d-e). 
Here, Alcibiades offers a fuller description of Socrates' activity in these 
silent moments. As in the example reported by Apollodorus, Alcibiades tells 
the symposiasts that Socrates starts thinking about some problem. He stands 
146 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES 
outside in the presence of other people during the experience. Alcibiades also 
emphasizes Socrates' commitment to the experience: despite the difficulty of 
solving the problem, "he wouldn't give up." In this context, Socrates seems 
to have transcended time. Alcibiades emphasizes this aspect of the experience 
by noting that it starts and ends at dawn. The references to the movements of 
the sun show Socrates' commitment to the task. Alcibiades mentions six 
times Socrates standing motionlessness. Unlike the previous experience, 
Alcibiades and the soldiers do not disrupt Socrates. They see Socrates as 
something of a spectacle. But they do not disturb him. They give him the 
space to have his experience. Given their response to Socrates, it is a fuller 
representation of the experience than in the earlier description where both 
Aristodemus and Agathon' s slaves interrupt him numerous times (1997: 17 4e-
17 Sb). This may explain a significant dissimilarity between this account and 
Aristodemus' report, namely, the length of time that Socrates engages in this 
silent practice. Aristodemus reports that Socrates' moments of"going off" do 
not last long. Here, Socrates' stands stark still over the course of an entire day. 
Alas, Alcibiades offers no insight into Socrates' own understanding of 
the experience. He does not report how Socrates characterizes the wisdom he 
received. Alcibiades mentions that Socrates prays at the beginning of the new 
day, and goes about his regular activities. As a result, some speculation is 
involved in ascertaining precisely what Socrates is experiencing during this 
time. That Alcibiades mentions Socrates' prayer places this meditation 
practice in a spiritual context. But what is Socrates actually experiencing in 
these trance states? Is he communing with the divine or seeing the good 
itself? Is he simply absent-minded, following in the philosophical footsteps of 
Thales, who fell into a ditch while looking at the stars? Surprisingly, there is 
little treatment of Socrates' trance state in the secondary literature. Those who 
speculate about its philosophical importance typically suggest that Socrates is 
experiencing a vision of the beautiful itself. Thus, Scott claims that Socrates 
is experiencing the highest levels of Diotima' s ladder of love when he stands 
and thinks for prolonged periods of time. Elizabeth Belfiore simply regards 
him as deeply engaged in the process of thinking (2012: 113 ). At the opposite 
end, Waddington (1992) suggests that Socrates' trances are a consequence of 
dissociative phenomena occurring during intense and prolonged stimulation. 
There are two other references to Socrates' silent activity in the Phaedo. 
After reporting Socrates' discussion of the importance of philosophers 
becoming detached from the body to the extent possible, Phaedo tells his 
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audience that: "When Socrates finished speaking there was a long silence. He 
appeared to be concentrating on what had been said, and so were most of us" 
(1997: 84c). Later, after it seems that most of the arguments for the 
immortality of the soul have failed, Phaedo again reports that: "Socrates was 
silent for a long time, lost in thought" (1997: 95e). In the Phaedo, Socrates 
faces a highly charged emotional situation, namely, his own death, and the 
emotional reactions of his family and closest students in response to his 
pending demise. It is clear that most are overcome with emotion. Indeed, 
Apollodorus wails and laments like a woman through the whole dialogue, and 
his actions cause all the others to break down as well (1997: 177d). Socrates' 
own comportment in the face of death stands in stark contrast to their 
behavior. It is possible that what Socrates experiences during these moments 
of silence helps him face his situation with equanimity and grace, with his 
human dignity intact. 
Phaedo offers a few tantalizing clues about what Socrates might be 
experiencing during these moments of silent meditation. On this last day, they 
discuss the soul and its ultimate fate, and what the soul does at the highest 
levels of its philosophical experience. Socrates offers a description of the 
activity of the soul in the Phaedo: "But when the soul investigates by itself it 
passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, 
and being akin to this, it always stays with it whenever it is by itself and can 
do so; it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch with 
things of the same kind, and its experience then is what is called wisdom" 
(1997: 79d). This sounds very much like what some contemporary neuro-
scientists call open monitoring meditation. In this practice, one cultivates the 
ability to maintain a calm and still state of mind while continuously 
monitoring one's experience of each moment (Lutz 2008: 163). It seems 
likely that Socrates has a similar experience of open monitoring meditation 
during the two trance states reported in the Symposium. But what, precisely, 
does this mean, and what effect does it have on the one who experiences it? 
SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES 
The passages where Socrates is apparently in a trance may actually be 
periods of meditation. Spiritual exercises such as meditation fit well into the 
larger Socratic project, which is largely about becoming a fully realized human 
being. As Hadot points out: "When Socrates said that virtue is knowledge, he 
was not using 'knowledge' to mean pure, abstract knowledge of the good. 
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Rather, he meant knowledge which chooses and wants the good--in other 
words, an inner disposition in which thought, will, and desire are one" (2002: 
65; emphasis added). But how does one achieve such inner disposition? 
Surely not by merely engaging in philosophical discourse about propositional 
truth claims, though one may agree with Hadot that philosophical discourse 
is an essential part of the Socratic project. Cultivating a unified inner 
disposition--what S0ren Kierkegaard calls purity ofheart--requires practices 
alongside discourse. Plato clearly believes that philosophy is a way of life, 
one that requires more than just discourse. Hadot recalls that: 
In his Seventh Letter, Plato declares that if we do not adopt this way of 
life, life is not worth living .... Plato alludes to this kind of life when 
he evokes the figure of his disciple Dion of Syracuse. It consists in 
"setting more store by virtue than by pleasure," in renouncing the 
pleasures of the senses, in observing a specific diet, and in "living every 
day in such a way as to become master of oneself as much as possible" 
.... certain spiritual practices, which have left many traces in many 
passages in the dialogues, were in use in the academy (2002: 66). 
The few passages where Socrates is in a trance state are not the only ones 
that allude to spiritual exercises. Hadot cites Paul Rabbow, who argues that 
the dialogues allude to different spiritual exercises. At the end of Timaeus, 
Socrates states that "he who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and of 
true wisdom, and has exercised his intellect more than any other part of him, 
must have thoughts immortal and divine, if he attains truth . . . he will be 
perfectly happy" (1997: 90c ). Socrates goes on to indicate that this person will 
achieve a kind of harmony with the universe and assimilation to the deity. 
Surely, this practice is contemplative in nature, with similarities to practices 
in traditional hatha yoga and Christian monks like Evagrius Ponticus. 
For example, the Yoga Sutras state emphatically that when the 
fluctuations of mind cease, the seer (that is, the soul) abides in its own true 
nature (Bryant 2009: YS 1.3). Other sutras attest to the beneficial effect of 
stilling the fluctuations of the mind, so that one attains "freedom from all 
disturbances" (Bryant 2009: YS 1.29). One gains "cheerfulness, one-
pointedness, sense control, and fitness to perceive the self," and the "highest 
control of the senses" (Bryant 1009: YS 2.41, 2.55). Evagrius speaks of the 
mystical union between humanity and God: "How much more then is this not 
the case with the intelligible sea, which is infinite and unchangeable, namely 
God the Father? When minds flow back to him like torrents into the sea, he 
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changes them all completely into his own nature, color and taste. They will 
no longer be many but one, in his unending and inseparable unity, because 
they are united and joined with him" (Linge 2000: 546). This union with the 
divine requires spiritual exercises that engender purity of heart, since the 
reflection "is only possible for those who have been purified in some measure 
... whereas the impure have no insight" (Linge 2000: 561). 
Several practices aimed at stilling the vicissitudes of excessive 
emotionality are alluded to in the Republic. Perhaps the most important is in 
Book IX, where Socrates mentions that many of our most terrible and savage 
· drives are revealed to us in our dreams. Socrates states that the healthy and 
temperate person has "awakened his rational powers," collected himself in 
meditation, and moderated his appetites, and that this person is most likely to 
be free of"lawless visions" (1997: 571-72). Once again, there are parallels in 
Evagrius as well as in the later monastic writer, St. John Climacus. In the 
Praktikos, Evagrius states that: "The proof of apatheia is that the nous begins 
to behold its proper gentle radiance; that it remains tranquil in the presence of 
visions during sleep; and that it looks at matters calmly" (Tugwell 1987: 5). 
For Evagrius, apatheia is achieved through various spiritual exercises, 
including fasting, keeping watch over one's thoughts, and meditation. These 
are all practices passed down through the philosophical schools to the 
Christian monastic tradition, another good reason to assume that Plato had 
something similar in mind. 
Hadot mentions Evagrius and his inheritance of philosophical practices 
(2002: 249-50). One need not even maintain a strong development between 
Platonic and Christian practices to consider Socrates' practice in these terms. 
Kingsley's research into incubation techniques of the ancient Greeks may offer 
one possible explanation of what Socrates is doing. In the Dark Places of 
Wisdom, Kingsley describes the practice: "You would do absolutely nothing. 
You'd just have to surrender to your condition. You would lie down as if you 
were dead; wait without eating or moving, sometimes for days at a time. And 
you'd wait for the healing to come from somewhere else, from another level 
of awareness and another level of being" (1999: 80). While there is a 
significant difference between Socrates standing and lying down in a cave, 
Kingsley's insight is still helpful. His insight seems particularly relevant when 
one considers that incubation took place within the context of Apollo worship, 
and all the references to Socrates' activity occur in dialogues filled with 
abundant references to Apollo. 
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A well-known Platonic spiritual exercise occurs in the Phaedo. On the 
day of his execution, Socrates engages in philosophical conversation with his 
closest friends on the topics of the soul, death, and immortality. The 
discussion of the exercise of death begins with the topic of liberating the soul 
from the body. Socrates asks: "And does purification not turn out to be what 
we mentioned in our argument some time ago, namely, to separate the soul as 
far as possible from the body and accustom it to gather itself and collect itself 
out of every part of the body and to dwell by itself as far as it can both now 
and in the future, freed, as it were, from the bonds of the body" (1997: 67d)? 
Socrates makes the reason for this liberation clear a few moments earlier when 
he avers that "only the body and its desires cause war, civil discord and battles, 
for all wars are due to the desire to acquire wealth, and it is the body and the 
care of it, to which we are enslaved" (1997: 66c ). The body and its desires 
cause the self great hardship if the self is controlled by its desires, and not vice 
versa. The philosopher will never achieve autonomy and the unification of the 
self so long as its aimless desires are in control rather than its true self, that is, 
the intellect. 
So, how does the philosopher achieve control over one's desires? 
Socrates tells Simmias and Cebes: "I'm afraid that other people do not realize 
that the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to 
practice for dying and death," and later remarks that "it would be ridiculous 
for a man to train himself in life to live in a state as close to death as possible, 
and then to resent it when it comes" (1997: 64a, 67d). The reason for such 
training is clear: ''the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, 
neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, 
taking leave of the body and as far as possible having no contact or association 
with it in its search for reality" (1997: 65c ). Socrates suggests that knowledge 
comes when the self does not allow any of the senses to intrude upon the 
process of thinking: he will most accurately "grasp that thing itself which he 
is investigating," and "come closest to the knowledge ofit" (1997: 65e ). There 
is a strong connection between training for death, withdrawing from the 
senses, and meditation. By ''training for dying and death," Socrates clearly 
means being able to think without one's bodily appetites and desires 
constantly begging for attention and interruption of the thought process. One 
way that the Stoics and Christian monks in the desert accomplished this was 
by placing skulls in their cells. More important, they also meditated, focusing 
on breathing and maintaining attention on a chosen object or idea On the 
notion of breathing techniques, Hadot states that ''the idea of the soul as breath 
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is enough to allow us to suppose the existence of such techniques. It may be 
that the Platonic exercise which consisted in concentrating the soul, which is 
usually dispersed throughout all parts of the body, ought to be understood 
from this perspective" (2002: 181). Along these lines, Jeffrey Gold suggests 
that the eschatological myth that occurs at the end of Phaedo is best 
understood as a symbolic representation of "a meditation technique that 
appears to involve moving hot and cold energy up and down the spinal column 
through the cakras (energy centers)" (1996: 24). Gold argues that this 
breathing technique has close parallels to yoga, and that this is the main 
spiritual exercise that Socrates is recommending to achieve liberation of the 
soul and the unification of the self. 
This understanding of spiritual exercises in the dialogues sheds 
remarkable light on passages from the Symposium and Phaedo. Socrates was 
clearly committed to the philosophical life understood as liberation from 
aimless desire and the goal of knowledge of the good, the beautiful, and the 
true--knowledge that chooses and wants those qualities--and a unified, 
autonomous self. These profound changes in self-comportment are not 
achieved merely through cognitive assent to propositions, but through the 
transformation of the self that requires profound emotional control. Sustained 
periods of focused breathing, close attention to one's thoughts or simple 
maxims, and divesting oneself of physical pleasures, are all exercises to help 
achieve these goals, exercises that Socrates clearly mentions and practices. As 
Hadot indicates, ''the passages in the Symposium that describe the long periods 
in which Socrates stood still and reflected upon himself, without moving or 
eating" were "an askesis of the body and of thought--a divestment of the 
passions in order to accede to the purity of the intelligence" (2002: 67). 
EFFECTS OF MEDITATION ON NEUROLOGICAL ACTIVITY 
A recent flurry of research in neurobiology and psychology focuses on 
various forms of emotion regulation and the impact of intentional mental acts 
on neurological activity. One of the most ancient and well-documented 
methods for regulating one's emotions is meditation, defined as "a family of 
complex emotional and attentional regulatory strategies developed for various 
ends, including the cultivation of well-being and emotional balance" (Lutz 
2008: 163). Furthermore, meditation is a cognitive activity that helps the 
agent regulate one's emotions in part by developing the skill of sustained 
attention. The assumption of many ancient religious and philosophical schools 
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of thought is that a flourishing or well-lived life is one where the selfis in tune 
with reality--both the internal self and the external world. This "being in tune" 
with reality means seeing reality as it actually is, and not as construed by the 
selfs false perceptions, that is, thoughts and emotions that falsely represent 
the world (including the self) to the self. The ability to pay close attention to 
one's inner life and experiences, or to a particular object or task, helps the self 
to have a clearer view of reality as well as a calmer, more relaxed, state of 
being. 
Contemporary researchers like Antoine Lutz and colleagues describe two 
styles of meditation: (1) "Focused Attention (FA) meditation, entails the 
voluntary focusing of attention on a chosen object;" and (2) "Open Monitoring 
(OM) meditation, involves non-reactive monitoring of the content of 
experience from moment to moment" (2008: 163). One may conjecture that 
Socrates has some proficiency at both styles of meditation. He demonstrates 
an amazing ability to focus his attention on a problem for a sustained period 
of time (which in tum gives him the ability to filter out such negative stimuli 
as Agathon' s sexual advances or the prospect of an unjust death sentence), and 
he demonstrates profound awareness ofhis own emotional states as well as the 
emotional states of those around him. Both of these forms of meditation are 
intentional, take years of practice to master, increase the practitioner's ability 
to both control or suppress emotions and focus attention on a particular task, 
and are accompanied by neurological changes. Furthermore, they seem to 
function like other skills since they are more difficult for the intermediate 
meditator than an expert. Finally, due in part to the fact that an expert 
meditator can focus attention and regulate emotions without the amount of 
neurological activity it takes an intermediate meditator to do the same, 
preliminary research suggests that there are deep and enduring neurological 
changes that result from long-term meditation practice. 
There is mounting evidence that meditation changes brain activity and 
even structure. First, one need not be a lifetime practitioner of meditation in 
order for the practice to bear neurological fruit. In one study, researchers 
taught subjects with no prior meditation training or experience a practice 
called KirtanKriya that integrates breathing, verbalized sound, and movement 
(Newberg & Waldman 2009). In this variation, the practitioner consciously 
regulates one's breath, repeats certain sounds, and subsequently touches the 
thumb to the fingers while repeating the sounds. This repetitive movement 
and verbalizatio~ help keep the mind focused. One subject the researchers 
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called Gus illustrates the benefits of this method. At the beginning of the 
experiment, the researchers performed a baseline scan of the brain while Gus 
was resting, as well as while he tried the technique for the first time. Gus (and 
other participants) were then instructed to practice for twelve minutes a day 
for eight weeks, and then the researchers performed the same brain scans. In 
Gus' post-training baseline (resting) scan, there was increased neural activity 
in the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate (an area associated with 
emotion regulation and social awareness, inter alia). In the post-training 
meditation scan, there was increased activity in the PFC and AC, but also in 
the cerebellum and basal ganglia Further, Gus demonstrated "enhanced 
abilities in memory recall, concentration, and verbal fluency," as did all the 
other subjects (2009: 33). 
In a study not involving meditation, but that still demonstrates the affect 
that cognitive practices can have on the brain, half the subjects were taught 
how to juggle and were given three months to practice, while the other half 
acted as controls (Draganski 2004: 311-12). The researchers used a whole-
brain MRI and found that "these individuals show a transient and selective 
structural change in brain areas ... associated with the processing and storage 
of complex visual motion" (2004: 11 ). Further, the juggler group showed a 
significant change in grey matter, while the controls did not, indicating that the 
change was the result oflearning the new ability. While this is not a case of 
meditation, it demonstrates the existence of neuroplasticity and, more 
important, that certain kinds of cognitive tasks and meditative practices can 
affect neural activity and mental ability after a very short time, as little as eight 
weeks. 
Other studies point to the ways that meditation alters brain activity and 
even neural circuitry. In a study examining the neurological anatomy of 
meditation practitioners, pronounced group differences indicating larger 
gyrification in meditators were evident: "Gyrification (the pattern and degree 
of cortical folding) is an important cerebral characteristic related to the 
geometry of the brain's surface" (Luders 2012: 6). Positive correlations 
between gyrification and the number of meditation years were pronounced in 
the right anterior dorsal insula, among other areas. This is significant, since 
Damasio and others suggest that ''the anterior insula may constitute a 'hub' for 
autonomic, affective, and cognitive integration" (2012: 7). Meditators 
(including Socrates) demonstrate a profound ability to self-regulate emotions 
and engage in sustained cognitive tasks without being distracted. The larger 
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gyrification may be partially responsible for this ability. Another study 
indicates that meditation can increase immune function in practitioners. In 
this study, subjects with no prior meditation experience were vaccinated after 
an eight-week meditation program. The subjects who participated in the 
meditation program showed less negative affect, and a "significantly greater 
rise in antibody titers" than the controls (Davidson 2003: 566). 
A study on the neuroanatomical effects of meditation focused on the 
correlation between aging and volume of gray matter and attentional focus in 
meditators and non-meditators (Pagnoni & Cekic 2007). It examined thirteen 
experienced meditators and thirteen controls. Researchers report that "control 
subjects displayed the expected negative correlation of both gray matter 
volume and attentional performance with age," however, "meditators did not 
show a significant correlation of either measure with age. The effect of 
meditation on gray matter volume was most prominent in the putamen, a 
structure strongly implicated in attentional processing" (2007: 1623). These 
fmdings are supported by other studies that demonstrate that as people age 
their cognition and memory are closely correlated with decreasing gray matter 
(Y asuyuki 2011 ). The Pagnoni study suggests that meditation practices help 
maintain healthy levels of gray matter, and allow the practitioners to maintain 
stronger overall attentional focus as they age. Since Socrates is allegedly 
seventy years old in Phaedo, the connection is highly suggestive. 
Other findings are even more relevant to understanding Socrates' silent 
trances. If our thesis is correct, then Socrates was a person who engaged in 
various spiritual exercises for many years, including, but not limited to, 
meditative practices. So, what neurological changes occur in practitioners 
with many years of meditative experience? In one study, experienced 
meditators (who practiced meditation for at least five hours a week for five 
years) were instructed to engage in a form of open-monitoring or mindfulness 
meditation, where they are to remain "in a quiescent state, receptive to any 
thoughts, emotions or sensations, but without any lingering on them, or 
allowing them to disrupt to the meditative state," while being shown a series 
of positive, negative, and neutral pictures (Sobolewski 2011: 45). Their brain 
activity was measured using an EEG machine. When compared to control 
subjects with no prior meditation experience, the experienced meditators did 
not exhibit the neurological response to the negative pictures that the novices 
did. The differences in neurological activity led researchers to posit that 
"meditation practitioners either perceive adverse emotional stimuli in a 
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different way from non-meditators or regulate (inhibit) the emotional reaction 
to negative stimuli--while processing of positive stimuli remains unaltered 
(uninhibited) ... (the) main source of this difference seems to involve frontal 
cortical regions" (2011: 165). 
Another study examined the neural basis of"one-pointed concentration," 
practiced to "strengthen attentional focus and achieve a tranquil state in which 
preoccupation with thoughts and emotions is gradually reduced" (Brefczynski-
Lewis 2007: 11483). It compared expertmeditators (10,000-54,000 hours of 
practice) with novices. All participants were asked to focus on a small fixed 
dot on a screen, while researchers interrupted them with distracting sounds, 
both while resting and while meditating. This study was designed to see what 
neural differences are evident in advanced meditators during meditation as 
well as rest. It might also identify different areas and systems in the brain that 
help sustain attention and guard against distraction. Some interesting results 
emerged. Both expert and novice meditators "activated a large overlapping 
network of attention-related brain regions," more so during active meditation 
than rest (2007: 11483). Novice meditators showed activation in brain regions 
that correlate negatively "with performance in a sustained attention task" 
(2007: 11484 ). The study also examined the difference between experts with 
10,000-24,000 hours of meditation (LHEM) and those with 37,000-53,000 
hours (MHEM). Experts with fewer hours (LHEMs) actually showed more 
neurological activity during meditation than those with more hours (MHEMs ). 
This suggests that sustained, focused attention is a skill that gets easier as the 
practitioner gets more proficient. In brief, the more proficient the meditator, 
the less effort it takes to engage in sustained attention, which makes it easier 
for the advanced meditatorto engage in simultaneous tasks such as monitoring 
and dismissing distractive stimuli. 
Another important neurological difference seen in expert meditators is 
less activation in the amygdala during focused attention meditation. This is 
not due to expert meditators simply ignoring distracting stimuli, because 
auditory processing regions "were more significantly activated to sounds in the 
practitioners compared with controls" (Lutz 2008: 165). Expertmeditators are 
quite aware of the stimuli, but they are not distracted by them. In an untrained 
meditator, the amygdala (the seat of such emotions as fear and anger) is 
suppressed by cortical regions such as the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Lieberman 2007: 421 ). This suggests that "concentration meditation leads to 
a partial 'deautomatization' of mental processes that shape and interpret 
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perceptual stimuli" (Lutz 2008: 165). Thus, substantial practice in attention-
focused meditation allows the practitioner to cultivate the neurological ability 
to limit the automatic reactions that the amygdala normally initiates. This 
ability allows the practitioner to focus on a chosen task, and more easily 
dismiss valence-laden stimuli. 
Looking at the relationship between meditation, conceptual processing, 
and distraction, researchers identified a default network that consists of "a set 
of brain regions that are metabolically active during wakeful rest and 
consistently deactivate in a variety of demanding tasks" (Pagnoni 2008: 1). 
This default network appears functionally linked to the stream of thoughts 
most people experience in the absence of goal-directed activity, what many 
meditative practices address through, for instance, disciplined regulation of 
attention, bodily posture, and breathing techniques: "In regions of the default 
network, meditators displayed a BOLD response related to semantic 
processing that was characterized by a reduced post-stimulus tail compared to 
control subjects" (2008: 3). Thus, experienced meditators could go from 
meditating to engaging in a cognitive task, and once they were finished with 
the task their brain activity returned to levels lower than the average default 
network levels of the controls. Researchers postulate that this is due to the 
ability of the experienced meditator to refocus attention on their breath after 
engaging in a cognitive task. The controls, on the other hand, returned to 
normal levels of neurological activity that translates into a stream of 
(potentially distracting) thoughts rather than a calm, focused meditative state. 
These studies suggest that meditative practices engender attentional focus, the 
ability to identify and dismiss distracting stimuli, and produce both immediate 
and enduring neurological changes. 
SOCRATIC SELF-COMPORTMENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
Belfiore claims that: "When engaged in thinking, Socrates turns inward, 
paying no attention to Aristodemus (174d4-7) or to his fellow soldiers at 
Potidaea (220cl-d5), and does not reveal the subject of his thoughts" (2012: 
113). This may not be quite true. While we are not told specifically what 
Socrates is thinking about or trying to accomplish, there is textual evidence in 
the Symposium implying that Socrates is engaged in an intentional action with 
a specific aim during these experiences. In all instances, Socrates is puzzling 
about something, and returns to the plane of existence of the original puzzle. 
These meditative interludes allow Socrates to hone his attentional skills and 
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prepare himself to face potentially negative emotional stimuli. Indeed, 
Socrates' opening comment in the Symposium about his unusual appearance 
suggests a level of preparation. Socrates attends to his appearance so that 
"beauty might match beauty" (1997: 17 4b ). Would it not make sense that he 
also engage in inner preparation to meet the upcoming task just as he attends 
to outer physical preparation to match the unusual circumstance? In fact, the 
very first sentence of the Symposium suggests that preparation is an underlying 
motif of the dialogue. Apollodorus begins the whole account telling an 
unnamed friend that he is "not unprepared" to offer the account of the 
speeches on love (1997: 172a). 
Granted, Alcibiades describes Socrates as "thinking about some problem 
or another" (1997: 220c). This indicates that the experience has cognitive 
content. However, the problem could be existential, not merely theoretical. 
The dramatic situations in which the trances occur are highly emotionally 
charged. The first account of the trance occurs while Socrates is on his way 
to a party where many partygoers are erotically involved, and some are intent 
on seducing Socrates. While the symposiasts at the party give speeches on 
love, Socrates' speech reportedly comes from Diotima. Notably, during his 
description of his conversation with Diotima in which she describes the ladder 
of ascent that begins with the love of beautiful bodies and culminates in the 
love of the good, Socrates loses focus (1997: 210a-e). 
In order to grasp the good, the philosopher must be able to move beyond 
the love of sensible valence-laden objects such as beautiful bodies, and sustain 
one's attention long enough to gaze upon the good. Socrates avers that he is 
unable to sustain his focus even in a conversation about the good, but surely 
this is not the case. Rather, it is meant to tell us what it takes to become good. 
It takes sustained attention and the ability to guard oneself against distractions. 
Later, when Alcibiades makes his entrance, he presents a clear vision of a 
person who has not moved beyond the love of beautiful bodies. He represents 
a false image of the good in juxtaposition to Diotima's image of the beautiful 
itself that Socrates just uttered. Socrates must be prepared to withstand the 
sexual advances of Alcibiades and the others if he is to continue his quest for 
goodness. But Alcibiades' speech about Socrates reveals more about the 
latter's meditative practices and what they inculcate. Alcibiades describes the 
trance as occurring during war. In the Charmides, Socrates makes clear that 
the battle was severe, and there were many casualties (1997: 153a). Socrates 
sustains his attention in the middle of an extreme negative valence-laden 
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situation. Further, Alcibiades indicates that Socrates can withstand extreme 
cold, and can go without sleep (as his meditative state lasts through the night). 
Interestingly, Patafijali notes that the accomplished yogic meditator is un-
bothered by such dualities (Bryant 2009: Il, 48). Alcibiades describes Socrates 
as an ascetic, yet a strange kind who can drink as much as he likes without 
getting drunk, enjoy fine food or go without eating, and go without sleep if 
needed. Socrates stays up all night at the party (he never gets drunk), and then 
simply gets up and goes on with his normal routine (1997: 222a). 
The study on conceptual processing and attentional focus of meditation 
practitioners (Pagnoni 2008) has clear parallels to Socrates in the Symposium 
and Phaedo. Whether in the middle of war, a sexually charged social context, 
or awaiting his execution, Socrates is able to engage in a philosophically rich 
discussion among friends, but still needs moments (sometimes extended 
periods) where he can refocus attention and regain his composure. Whereas 
his friends and interlocutors are emotionally affected by the situation, Socrates 
is able to fully engage without being overcome by emotion. He is not carried 
away by the incessant flow of distracting thoughts and emotions. Surely, this 
is not due to simply being elderly or absent-minded. Rather, Socrates sustains 
his attention over long periods of time. He monitors potentially distracting 
stimuli and dismisses them without losing focus, and encounters situations 
with negative valence, and emerges unscathed. One surmises that this ability 
is due to Socrates using his times of meditation to focus his mind and prepare 
himself for the world. These practices serve as both a way to access the good 
and as a protective mechanism. The trances prepare Socrates for the 
complexities that he will encounter, and enable him to respond to those 
complexities without withdrawing from them. They offer him the ability to 
be in the world, but not of the world. 
Plato's portrait of Socrates in these dialogues suggests that philosophical 
commitments alone are not all that one needs to follow the Socratic 
injunctions to "know thyself' and live an examined life. One may need to 
develop some meditative strategies as well. Technology offers exciting 
opportunities to enhance human flourishing. At the same time, technology 
presents many challenges in that it can become a dehumanizing force. This 
suggests the need to embrace therapeutic modes of self-care, whose efficacy 
can be established through technology as a means of battling the challenges 
to human dignity in the contemporary age, such as mass media, consumerism, 
the proliferation of personal computing devices, and the erosion of privacy. 
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Finding therapeutic means can create the space for the continued flourishing 
of humanity. Practices such as Socratic meditation offer humanity promising 
therapeutic options. Revisiting Socrates as depicted in the Platonic dialogues 
and new evidence due to emerging technologies provide a path to follow, 
manifesting true dignity as human beings within the complexities of a 
technological world. 
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UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
T he trouble with the future--taken by itself--is that it is hard to talk about with much specificity, and this is a problem that particularly 
informs Paul Dourish and Genevieve Bell's Divining a Digital 
Future. The authors take up an interesting issue concerning Mark Weiser's 
1991 observation that truly successful technologies get iterated out of sight in 
the sense that they transform old landscapes into wholly new environments, 
which then seem natural and inevitable. Weiser forecast the disappearance of 
the desktop computer, asserting that its then-remarkable capacities would soon 
be blended into the structures of everyday life--the walls of one's own home, 
for example. This prospect, which Weiser called ubiquitous computing or 
ubicomp, for short, was really more than a forecast. It was also a goal, a way 
of predicting and cashing in on the future by inventing it. 
Weiser' s ubicomp prediction, say the authors, is a mythology that has 
taken hold among futurists over the past two decades. There are similar, 
competing mythologies, but unlike some futurists, who thought only about 
new gadgets, Weiser proposed deep cultural reorientations to catalyze the 
